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The study investigates the role of Navy laboratories in
the systems acquisition process. In particular, it looks at
an attempt to expand the laboratories' traditional role of
technical management to include complete management of hard-
ware projects in advanced and engineering development
phases. The AGILE air-to-air missile development, the basis
for this study, presents an opportunity to test the feasibi-
lity of decentralized management of defense procurement in
actual practice.
In evaluating the effectiveness of Navy management of the
acquisition process it is recognized that more than one cri-
teria may be relevant. The evaluation is based on two
standards of measurement: compliance with Department of
Defense policy and conformance to generally accepted princip-
les of management.
AGILE, a current development program, is traced from
inception to the present and unique management problems are
discussed. The authors conclude that unless a total commit-
ment to decentralized management is made the present manage-
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One of the most serious problems confronting the De-
partment of Defense is inefficiency in the management of
the acquisition of major new weapons systems. The record
of the past decade indicates generally poor performance in
terms of the cost effectiveness of the systems procured.
It is difficult to find a development program without major
cost growth, schedule slippage, or other difficulties.
Many systems being developed failed to achieve performance
goals, especially in the areas of reliability and maintain-
ability. These real shortcomings, magnified by the general
anti-defense attitude present in the nation as a result, in
part, of our Vietnam involvement, has generated widespread
concern for the quality of systems acquisition management.
The news media provides daily evidence of the concern
voiced in the committee rooms and on the floor of Congress
that cost overruns and deficient performance have been the
consistent result of weapons systems acquisition programs.
Since 1969, industry councils, defense review boards, and a
Presidential Blue Ribbon Commission have all recommended
changes in the policies and procedures governing defense
system acquisition activity. The General Accounting Office
has reported extensively on the problem and even congress-
men generally considered friendly to the military
establishment have become increasingly identified with a
critical view of the existing state of affairs.

B. A SEARCH FOR AN ANSWER
In seeking ways to improve the procurement of new wea-
pon systems in the Navy a number of innovative ideas have
been proposed. This study is concerned with one such idea
presently being tested: placing the responsibility for man-
agement of a major system development program in a Navy
laboratory. It examines the creation of a project office
for the development of the AGILE Advanced Short Range Air-
to-Air Missile System and the assignment of total program
management as the "direct responsibility of the Naval Wea-
pon Center, China Lake, California." '•••••, •.••"..
Navy laboratories have long been deeply involved with
the definition of mission requirements and the military ap-
plications of technological advance. They represent a
wealth of knowledge that can be helpful in a variety of
ways in the task of providing effective and credible weapons
systems to the fleet. Within its field of specialization,
each Navy laboratory and research center is responsible for
a number of missions and functions such as warfare analysis,
advancement and application of technologies of unique mili-
tary interest, development of new weapon systems concepts
and acting as technical advisors to both operating and mater-
ial command s
.
Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Research and Develop-
ment) memorandum to the Chief of Naval Operations and the
Chief of Naval Material, Subject: AGILE Weapon System De-
velopment; responsibility assignment, 26 April 1971.

C. THE HYPOTHESIS
The concept of project management employing a matrix
organization is not new. It has long been used by the Navy
systems commands and the private defense industry for the
management of acquisition and development programs. The
concept is equally at home in the Navy laboratories where
it gained early acceptance. What is unique is the concept
of placing total system management responsibility in the
laboratory environment.
On the surface, the AGILE program would seem to involve
more of a change in management emphasis than a fundamental
change in the way the Navy manages the acquisition process.
It is a logical development in the current trend toward de-
centralization and participatory management in the Department
of Defense. It is, however, the hypothesis of this paper
that implementing the decision to manage a large and impor-
tant acquisition in the laboratory requires fundamental
changes to organization and staffing and a definition of the
relationships between the laboratory and other organizations
involved in the Navy acquisition process. If project man-
agement is to function successfully in the laboratory, the
laboratory's goals and objectives must be modified as well.
D. THE INVESTIGATION
The purpose of this investigation is to examine the
AGILE missile development at the Naval Weapon Center, China
Lake to determine the effectiveness of decentralization in
systems acquisition management. It was conducted in three
8

parts. Part one consisted of research in basic management
disciplines to arrive at a useful definition of Project
Management. During this phase, documentation for the AGILE
program was gathered and analyzed. Part two consisted of
observation and data collection conducted at the Naval Wea-
pon Center, China Lake. This effort consisted of four
visits spaced over a period of seven months. The organiza-
tion and staffing of the AGILE project team was reviewed
and in-depth interviews were conducted. Visits were timed
to coincide with key decision points in the development
cycle to permit first-hand observation of the decision pro-
cess whenever possible. The data generated by these
interviews became the basis for the third part of the inves-
tigation. Part three consisted of the gathering of
information concerning the attitudes of top Navy and Depart-
ment of Defense management toward project management.
Interviews were conducted for two purposes: Officers and
civilian managers with a direct interest in the AGILE mis-
sile development program were questioned about issues, facts,
expectations and opinions held concerning that program.
They, along with the managers and personnel of other pro-
grams were interviewed to obtain information related to the
current DoD project management environment.
E. CRITERIA FOR EVALUATION
Perhaps the most difficult task encountered was that of
defining the standards by which systems acquisition manage-
ment will be judged. One problem lies in the fact that more

than one objective is associated with the AGILE program.
The primary goal is development of an effective air-to-air
missile. Subsidiary goals include learning more about the
costs associated with development programs and stimulating
the growth of effective management in the laboratories.
Each goal implies a different criteria for evaluation. An-
other problem is associated with the scope of the
investigation. Specific management actions that appear to be
warranted from a program standpoint may not be optimal from
a Department of Defense or government-wide point of view.
The third difficulty is related to the stage of development
in which the investigation ended. The AGILE program is
currently in the later stages of advanced development. Se-
lection of a systems integrating contractor to work in
partnership with the Naval Weapons Center in engineering
development is pending. This investigation was conducted
during a seven month period from August 1972 to February
1973 during this most interesting period in AGILE'S life
cycle
.
The use of an on-going program as the focus for this
study lends relevance, and, for the authors, greater inter-
est to the effort. It does, however, impose certain
limitations on the scope of the study. The most important
measure of the success of the systems acquisition process is
the quality of the end product. An effective, reliable wea-
pon system delivered to the fleet on time and at a reasonable
cost is the ultimate criteria against which AGILE management
10

should be judged. This final judgement is still several
years in the future. Conclusions reached at this time con-
cerning the effectiveness of AGILE management are, of
necessity, speculative.
The criteria by which the overall AGILE program manage-
ment will be measured are taken from the widely accepted
principles of management set forth by both scholars and prac-
titioners. They will be applied from a program oriented
point of view. In addition, program management will be
measured for compliance to established Department of Defense
policy
.
1 . Management Principles
a . Planning
Planning is the process by which the manager
develops the roadmap to enterprise objectives. Specific
policies, objectives and guidelines have to be developed for
each enterprise, and these must be clearly understood and
supported at all levels in the organization. The greater
the degree of vertical goal congruence within the organiza-
tion, the better the chance of reaching the objective.
Planning implies change, and people, both mana-
gers and employees, who have developed patterns of thought
and behavior related to specific objectives find it hard to
change. Closely allied to this psychological inflexibility
are the inflexibilities inherent in policies, procedures and
traditions. Once established, these become ingrained in the
11

organization and changing them is difficult. Being aware
of these obstacles, top management, with the participation
of subordinate managers, must develop a plan which provides
for the organizational changes necessary for decentraliza-
tion. When an organization faces the need for
decentralization, research and planning are required. Not
only must the requirement of finding the right people to fill
key positions be met but the following four essential fea-
tures of decentralized authority and responsibility must be
/provided for:






1) Management must f unc t ionalize planning and
control, consolidating these tasks in a separate department.
2) Management must make a precise determination
of the lines of authority and responsibility.
3) Management must define clearly the methods
by which the various division and department heads can par-
ticipate in planning.
4) Management must develop methods of control
which are adapted to the need of coordinated action in a de-
centralized organization.
Decision making is vital to planning. In the
system acquisition process the selection of an alternative
solution is made as the result of a trade-off analysis. The
decision should be based on a selection from all available
alternatives and be a matter of weighing expected results




In order to accomplish organizational objectives,
carry out plans, and encourage subordinates to work effec-
tively and efficiently a controlled and effectively-directed
organization must be put into being in the execution phase of
the management process.
1) Organization and Staffing
Two functions of management, organization and
staffing, are so closely related that they are often discussed
;.,• together without any distiction. An organization structure
should be designed to clarify the environment so that every-
one knows who is to do what, to remove obstacles to performance
caused by confusion and uncertainty of assignment, and to fur-
nish a communications network reflecting and supporting
enterprise objectives.
2) Control
Another basic function of management is con-
trol. Control is the process that measures current performances
and guides it toward some predetermined goal. The essence
of control lies in checking existing actions against some
desired results determined in the planning process. When
deviations are uncovered, corrective action is taken. The
essential elements of any control system are: a predeter-
mined goal, a means for measuring current activity
(quantitatively, if possible), a means of comparing current
activity with the goal, and the means of correcting current
activity so as to achieve the desired result. Planning is
a prerequisite for this important managerial function.
13

3) Communicating and Directing
The discussion of the functions of the man-
agerial process is concluded by focusing attention on
communicating and directing. Communication provides a link
among all other functions while direction initiates actual
performance
.
The effectiveness of a communication is a
serious problem. Usually the more direct the communication,
the more effective it will be. In an organization, the num-
ber of levels through which a communication travels affects
the action that is finally taken. Thus, the communication
problem increases as the size of the organization increases.
Of course, effectiveness of communications depends upon both
efficient transmission of messages and the understanding of
their meaning. In the final analysis, the acceptance of the
communication is the key to effectiveness.
The directing function of management is the
heart of the managerial process because it is involved with
initiating actions that put into effect the decisions, plans
and programs for achieving the organizational goal. Although
an important part of directing, individual management styles
will not be discussed in this paper.
2 . Department of Defense Policy
Weapon systems acquisition management must interact
with the complex system employed by the Secretary of Defense
to administer and control those resources entrusted to the
Department of Defense. The layers of authority above the
14

project level impose important constraints on the Project
Manager's freedom of decision. The success of the program
he manages depends, in part, on how well he interacts with
that environment. For a better understanding of the envi-
ronment in which the Project Manager functions, the reader
is directed to the source material listed in the biblio-
graphy. The authors found the following materials especially
useful :
,
Introduction to Military Program Management




Department of the Navy, Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Re-
search and Development) Department of the Navy RDT&E
Management Guide, Part I : System Description
,
NAVSOP
2457 (Rev. 7-72) . ' ......
,
Navy Research, Development, Test and Evalua-
tion Program . Washington, D.C.: Naval Material
Command, March 1972.
,
Research and Development in Department of
Defense . Washington, D.C.: Office Director of Defense
Research and Engineering, November, 1971.
Department of Defense Directive 5000.1, Subject: Acquisitio n
of Major Defense Systems, 13 July 1971.
Department of the Navy Programming Manual.
Current Department of Defense Systems acquisition
policy was first set forth by former Deputy Secretary of De-
2fense David R. Packard in a memorandum dated 28 May 1970.
That guidance was promulgated as official policy by Depart-
ment of Defense Instruction 5000.1. The instruction
Department of Defense, Deputy Secretary of Defense
David R. Packard Memorandum, Policy Guidance on Major Weapon
System Acquisition
,
2 8 May 197 0.
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recognizes the need for sound management in the Department
of Defense and attempts to apply generally accepted manage-
ment principles to the systems acquisition process.
Pertinent provisions of this instruction related to program
management include the following:
a. "Responsibility and authority for the acquisi-
tion of major defense systems shall be decentralized to the
maximum practicable extent consistent with the urgency and
importance of each program."
.
.
•'-••.••..,'. ^ • :-.. "The development and production . of a major de-
fense system shall be managed by a single individual (program
manager) who shall have a charter which provides sufficient
authority to accomplish recognized program objectives."
c. "Layers of authority between the program manager
and his Component Head shall be minimum."
d. "The assignment and tenure of program managers
shall be a matter of concern to DoD Component Heads and shall
reflect career incentives designed to attract, retain and
3
reward competent personnel."
In the opinion of the authors, these principles and
the policies they support are sound. They are another stan-
dard against which AGILE management will be measured.
F. FORMAT
The remainder of this paper is organized into five chap-
ters. Chapter II discusses the evolution of the modern Navy
3
> Department of Defense Directive 5000.1, Acquisition of
Major Defense Systems
, 13 July 1971.
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laboratory system and the laboratory's traditional missions,
functions and role in the systems acquisition process. Or-
ganizational relationships and management of the laboratory
system are presented. Chapter III examines the working re-
lationship between the laboratories and their customers in
the Naval Systems Commands. Problem areas identified by var-
ious government commissions and study groups are reviewed.
Chapter IV presents the AGILE Missile Development Program from
its inception to the present. The decision to place manage-
..-, ,ment responsibility in the field and the Naval Weapons Center-
Naval Air Systems Command working agreement specifying the
organizational relationships and responsibilities for the
program are covered. The organization and staffing of the
AGILE project at NWC China Lake and its relationship with
higher echelons within the Navy is discussed. In Chapter V
AGILE management is evaluated using the criteria presented in
the introductory chapter. Chapter VI presents the authors'
conclusions concerning the effectiveness of AGILE management.
17

II. THE NAVY LABORATORIES
A. INTRODUCTION
The Navy laboratories have long been partners in the
weapon systems acquisition process with the material com-
mand and with industry. As an aid in understanding the role
the laboratories now play and assessing the feasibility of
having the laboratories assume total responsibility for
program management, the history and evolution of Navy and
other government laboratories is traced. Present organiza-
tiona'l relationships, missions', functions and roles of Navy
laboratories and research centers are specified. Problem
areas and management issues pertinent to the purpose of this
paper are examined.
B. HISTORY
1 . Founding of Government Laboratories
The Department of Defense in-house laboratories trace
their history back to the establishment of the Springfield
Arsenal in 1790. The traditional role of the arsenal system
was the production of war materials. In support of this
production mission, the arsenal system maintained an in-house
capability to perform research and development as well as man-
age and direct private contractor efforts. Emphasis was
This mission was specified by Congress in 10 US Code
4532 during World War I which stipulated that "the Secretary
of War should have his supplies made in factories or arsenals
owned by the United States, so far as those factories or ar-
senals can make those supplies on an economical basis."
18

placed on maintaining an independent capability to evaluate
and manage development contacts in support of defense de-
cision makers. The in-house laboratories performed this
technical management function through production prototyping,
at which time the production function was turned over to
industry
.
2 . The Navy Laboratories
World War II brought about the break with the tradi-
tional arsenal system. The government's sudden demand for
.. immense amounts of technical assistance in the crucial period
of mobilization brought industry, as well as numerous univer-
sities into the role of research and development performers.
Navy laboratories were established to satisfy the need for a
capability to investigate the military applications of ad-
vances in technology and to bring military problems to the
attention of the scientific community. Laboratories were
formed by the various bureaus to solve technical problems,
provide technical advice and assist in the technical manage-
ment of weapon system developments. Under the command of the
various bureaus and offices, each laboratory's growth and
development were dictated by the particular systems and
The first Navy research program was started in 1830 at
the Naval Observatory in the fields of magnetism, meteorology
and astronomy. Another early endeavor was the Marine Engi-
neering Laboratory, forerunner of the David Taylor Model
Baisin and the Naval Ship Research and Development Center,
Silver Springs, Md.. The first laboratory devoted exclusively
to military research, the Naval Research Laboratory was pro-
posed by the Naval Consultant Board of 1916, of which the





equipment its sponsor had responsibility for. These inde-
pendent courses of development were influenced by the
changing requirements of the sponsoring bureau and changes
in Navy organization and management philosophy.
3 . The Need for Change
The continued reliance on contract research and de-
velopment beginning in the late 1950s and extending into the
1960s led ultimately to questioning of the worth and effec-
tiveness of in-house laboratories on many fronts. During
..this period Secretary of Defense McNamara instituted several
changes in laboratory management. Laboratories were given
greater local authority over decisions on technical matters
and were encouraged to expand development capabilities to en-
compass systems engineering development. The position of
Director of Laboratories was created within each military
service to provide laboratory representation at a high poli-
cy-making level.
In 1966 Dr. John S. Foster, Jr. was appointed Director,
Defense Research and Engineering, bringing a new concept of
the roles and missions of the laboratories to the Department
This concern was expressed in Strengthening American
Sc ience , President's Science Advisory Committee, 1958. The
Report to the President on Government Contracting for Re-
search and Development
,
prepared by the Bureau of the Budget
and referred to the Committee on Government Operations,
United States Senate, 19 May 1962 (The Bell Report) recom-




of Defense. The concept of the weapon center or "center of
excellence," although not originated by Dr. Foster, won
acceptance under his leadership.
4 . Consolidation of the Navy Laboratories
In 1966, the Chief of Naval Material assumed command
of all Navy laboratories. In the next four years the fifteen
laboratories that then existed were consolidated into seven
research centers and three supporting laboratories that exist
.-.today. . The purpose of the consolidation was to bring together
in a single command the various capabilities necessary to at-
tack complex military problems in specific warfare areas.
'• C. PURPOSE OF NAVY IN-HOUSE LABORATORIES
The stated policy of the Navy is to maintain in-house
research and development laboratories in order to develop
and prosecute scientific and technical laboratory programs
having as their prime objective the improvement of Naval and
Marine Corps capabilities, equipments, and systems, and to
maintain a sufficient base of scientific and engineering
talent, experienced in Naval and Marine Corps matters as to
preclude the possibility of "technological surprise" due to
The idea that laboratories should be organized to sup-
port military missions rather than structured along functional
lines was developed as part of Task 97. When Robert S.
McNamara became Secretary of Defense in 1961, he asked 120
questions to provide the basis for the future posture of the
Department of Defense. Question 97 was, "Advise me ways in
which to improve the operations of the in-house laborator-
ies." To answer this question and to develop solutions to
the problems identified Task 97 was established.
21

unforeseen applications of science and technology by poten-
o
tial enemies. The laboratories enable the Navy to enter
the marketplace in the acquisition of new weapons and wea-
pons systems as sophisticated buyers, with technical
experience and expertise in the disciplines relevant to the
development of such systems. The laboratory system maintains
a technical memory of past technical problems and their so-
lutions to assist in the support of deployed equipment and
its improvement while in service, and keeps continuously
available the capability to exploit new technical opportuni-
ties on a quick reaction basis, often under tight security
controls, for the solution of Naval and Marine Corps
problems
.
D. ORGANIZATION OF NAVY RESEARCH CENTERS AND LABORATORIES
1 . Gene ra
1
That portion of the Navy organization concerned with
laboratories and research centers is shown in Figure II-l.
The Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research and Devel-
opment is limited to a small number of personal technical
assistants. To provide the staff to fulfill his assignments,
principal Navy Research, Development, Test and Evaluation
(RDT&E) officials are "double hatted," reporting directly to
Q
Department of the Navy, Headquarters Naval Material
Command NAVMAT Instruction 5450.27, Chief of Naval Material
Commanded Laboratories and Centers, Missions and Functions
of
, 27 June 1972.
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the Assistant Secretary in one function. For example, the
Deputy Chief of Naval Material for Development is also
Chief of Naval Development and the Director of Laboratory
Programs has the additional duty of Director of Naval Lab-
oratories. The laboratories or Research Centers having
responsibility for weapon system development come under the
command of the Chief of Naval Material. The Naval Weapon








,..%.; - Internal Laboratory Organization
Although it would be convenient to make some gener-
alizations concerning the internal organizational structure
of Navy laboratories, the temptation will be avoided because
of the wide variation in the organizational forms growing
out of the different missions, capabilities, facilities and
types of programs undertaken in the individual labs.
Figures II-2 and II-3 are the organizational charts
for the Naval Ordnance Laboratory, White Oak and the Naval
Weapons Center, China Lake, the two facilities visited in the
course of this study. Each has responsibility for the man-
agement of a major acquisition program. Although both
laboratories are organized along lines of functional disci-
plines, they have evolved different approaches to project
management organization.
The form adopted by the Naval Ordnance Laboratory,
White Oak is readily recognized as a matrix organization with
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The CAPTOR Project Manager has well-defined interfaces with
both the Naval Ordnance Systems Command and the ASW Systems
Project Manager.
The Naval Weapons Center, China Lake incorporated
the AGILE project as a division of the existing Systems
Development Department. The head of the AGILE Development
Division is assisted by a Management Plans and Program




functions but has no line authority to control. .The AGILE
,,...; . Development Division is somewhat larger than the usual Navy
Project Management organization. It depends on a combina-
tion of line control of these dedicated personnel and a
matrix interface with the functional organization for its
support .
3 . The Chief of Navy Laboratories
a. The Chief of Navy Laboratories/Director of Lab-
oratory Programs is responsible for the management of the
Naval Material Command RDT&E field activities. His duties
include controlling the in-house Exploratory Development
technical program and the application of programmed funds.
He is responsible for assuring optimum responsiveness of the
NMC RDT&E field activities to the sponsoring systems com-
mands, offices and PMs , and for guiding the In-house
laboratory Foundation Research and Independent Exploratory
Development programs and controlling the application of
programmed funds. He controls the management and support program and
the application of programmed funds. He is responsible for establishing
and sponsoring the Naval Material Command RDTf.E Military
27

Construction Program, determining the general distribution
of civilian personnal within the NMC RDT&E field complex,
and directing and coordinating long-range planning of NMC
RDT&E resources.
b. Under his charter as Chief of Navy Laboratories,
the Chief of Navy Laboratories /Director of Laboratory Pro-
grams is responsible to the Assistant Secretary of the Navy
(Research and Development) for the functions listed in the
preceeding paragraph. Broader responsibilities under this
charter include advising the Assistant Secretary of the Navy
(Research and Development) in the selection of key personnel '
and establishing laboratory requirements and policies. The
Director of Laboratory Programs represents the Assistant
Secretary on laboratory policy matters and acts as Chairman
of the Advisory Group to the Assistant Secretary of the Navy
(Research and Development) on laboratory matters.
The nature of his duties suggests extensive in-
volvement with management within the laboratories as well
as his broader concern for the entire program.
E. MISSIONS AND FUNCTIONS OF THE NAVAL LABORATORIES
1 . Missions
The missions of the laboratories and research cen-
ters commanded by the Chief of Naval Material are defined
in terms of their orientation toward technologies, weapons
platforms, or warfare areas. For example, the Naval Ord-
nance Laboratory is the principle Navy RDT&E center for
28

ordnance technology, concepts, and systems and the Naval
Weapons Center is the principle Navy RDT&E center for air
warfare and missile weapon systems.
2 . Functions of the Naval Laboratories
Specific and detailed functions performed by the
various Naval laboratories are contained in their individual
9Mission and Functions Statements. Because this study is
primarily concerned with the activities of the Naval Weapons
Center, its Statement of Missions and Functions is appended
as Appendix C to this study.
F. ROLES OF THE NAVAL LABORATORIES
The Navy laboratories and research centers accomplish
their missions and functions by performance of a variety of
tasks. Certain roles are common to all research and devel-
opment centers .
The laboratories carry out programs of warfare analysis
comprising intelligence studies, operations research, systems
analysis, participation in fleet exercises and operations,
and evaluation of fleet exercise results and operational re-
ports to provide an understanding of the operational and
support problems and opportunities facing the Fleet and
Fleet Marine Forces. They constantly seek new application
9 These Mission and Functions Statements are consolidated
as enclosures to Department of the Navy, Chief of Naval Ma-
terial, NAVMAT INSTRUCTION 5450.27 CNM-Command Laboratories
and Centers; Missions and Functions of . The Mission State-







of science and technology to Navy and Marine Corps problems
and advance the state of the art in those branches of
science and technology of unique or particular importance
to the Navy and Marine Corps and develop new weapon systems
and concepts to enhance the effectiveness of the Navy and
Marine Corps, prove the feasibility of critical components,
and build and demonstrate prototypes of such systems. Lab-
oratories and research centers act as project manager or
..provide technical direction during the development phase of
the acquisition process of new systems, when so directed, and
design and conduct technical tests of equipments and systems
and assist in technical and operational, evaluations of new
systems and procedures. The Navy laboratories act as tech-
nical advisors and consultants to CNO, CMC, CNM, the Systems
Commanders, the designated Project Managers, the other Navy
Bureaus and Commands, the Marine Corps Development and Edu-
cation Command and the operating forces on matters within
their areas of specialization. Navy research facilities
maintain and provide, the technical knowledge, skills, and
facilities to provide assistance to development programs and
to support, modify, and improve the equipments in use by the
Navy and Marine Corps.
30

III. THE LABORATORY SYSTEMS COMMAND INTERFACE
A. PURPOSE
This chapter examines the working relationships between
the Navy Systems Commands and the Navy Laboratories and com-
pares the methods by which they accomplish weapon systems
acquisition tasks. Problem areas in weapon systems acqui-
sition management within the systems commands and the
laboratories, particularly those identified by the Blue Rib-




B. THE NAVAL SYSTEMS COMMAND-LABORATORY PARTNERSHIP
1 . Background
The reorganization of the Navy laboratory system in
1966 placing it under the command of the Chief of Naval
Material caused a change in the relationships between the
Systems Commands and the laboratories. Whereas the systems
commands had been in the direct line of authority exercising
chain of command control over the laboratories in which they
had greatest interest, the reorganization greatly reduced
the system commander's control of the laboratories. The
result was a change in the system commander's role in rela-
tion to the laboratories from that of manager to the status
of customer. As customer the system commanders have greatly
reduced opportunity to influence laboratory policies and
management practices.
The lack of line authority does not appear to have
an overly important effect on the working relationship
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between the systems commands and the laboratories. Prior
to the reorganization, the systems commands customarily made
use of that laboratory or facility best suited to solve the
technical problem of the moment without regard for command
relationships and the laboratories were free to accept work
assignments from requesting agencies outside the sponsoring
command under terms and arrangements agreeable to all
parties . •
....... •,.. .The Systems Commands and the Project Managers have
an obligation to manage sponsored in-house research and de-
velopment no less diligently than that contracted for with
private industry. In the latter case, management and control
is facilitated by the contractual statement of what is to be
done and how it is to be accomplished, and by the contrac-
tor's profit-oriented motivation. In dealing with Navy
in-house laboratories, research and development sponsors
manage and control by establishing policy and demanding ex-
cellence in the execution of assigned work tasts. Perhaps
the most significant method of control is personal contact,
by telephone or visit, between technical personnel at the
working level. Systems commanders and Project Managers
controlling the assignment of resources can use the threat
of withdrawal of support or resources to stengthen their po-
sitions with respect to the laboratories.
2 . The Navy Industrial Fund
The essential element of control still available to
the systems commander or a designated project manager is
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financial control through the funding of work packages.
The system by which Navy laboratory operation is financed
is the Navy Industrial Fund. Essentially, this system en-
dows the laboratory with working capital to finance its
operations. Annual appropriations are still required for a
small amount of administrative support and for facilities
construction, but the funds for the performance of assigned
research and development including, allocated overhead, are
furnished by the Navy Industrial Fund. Funds expended on
assigned research and development work are replenished by
billing the sponsoring systems command "customer" for: the
full costs, including allocated overhead, of its products
and services. The mechanics of funds transfer involves the
issuance of a project order (NAVCOMPT Form 2053) by the
sponsoring command. When the project order is accepted by
the laboratory, the funds are immediately obligated by the
sponsor .
In addition to the sponsored research, each labora-
tory conducts independent in-house research unrelated to
existing systems or programs. Funding for this effort is
provided by the Chief of Naval Research through the Director
of Navy Laboratories and is managed by the laboratory tech-
nical director. Most of the laboratories are involved in a
broad spectrum of research and development activity ranging
from basic research to engineering development. The funding
for this basic research falling in Navy Research and Devel-
opment Budget Category 6 • 1 , is relatively insignificant to
the operation of the laboratories involved in weapon systems
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development, comprising approximately five percent of the
total operating budget in a typical laboratory. It is es-
timated that the sponsored research in Research and
Development Budget categories 6.2, 6.3 and 6.4 provides 85%
of the laboratory budget. The systems commands and pro-
ject managers determine where the work will be done.
Assignments to the laboratories are made directly
-i in 'accordance with the assigned missions and functions, ..•':••.-
facilities, and technical expertise of the laboratory. Al-
though some laboratories and systems commands are closely
coupled by the nature of their missions, sponsors have no
real responsibility for sustained support of the laborator-
ies. Funding control is clearly their strongest lever in
motivating laboratory management in the desired direction.
3 . Organizational View of the Systems Command-Field
Activity Interface
The flow of direction, policy guidance and other
communications between the systems commands and the field
activities may follow any of several established courses
depending on the type of communication and its importance
to management at the time. To understand why this is so,
it is necessary to examine the working relationships em-
ployed in managing development activity.
Before doing so, several considerations and obvious
distinctions that dictate or influence this organization
Department of Defense, Report of the Task Group on De -
fense In-House Laboratories , Annex A., 1 July 1971, p. 55.
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must be mentioned. Navy laboratories have developed to
varying degrees, the capability to provide management ser-
vices as well as technical direction for the development
programs they undertake. There is considerable variance
between the various systems commands and between functional
divisions within a command in technical expertise, managerial
skills, and motivation to get the job done. Finally, it
must be recognised that developing a missile system or an:
.
. .;.
electronic component has little, similarity, to developing an
entire airframe. A laboratory or systems command may have
unique ability in one area and still be functionally inept'
in another. These comments are included to point out the
error of generalization in discussing the systems command-
laboratory interface.
Because this paper is primarily concerned with a
missile development under the cognizance of the Naval Air
Systems Command, that organization will be used to illustrate
the organizational relationships involved in the systems
command- f ield activity interface. Figure III-l illustrates
the organizational and command relationships and the lines
of communications involved in a Naval Air Systems Command
project management relationship. The project manager, char-
tered by the Naval Air Systems Command, reports directly to
the Commander and reports to the Deputy Command for Plans and
Programs for administrative purposes only. The project man-
ager and his organization interface with the functional
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Contracting and Logistics and Fleet Support) through pro-
ject coordination at a working level. The head of each
functional division designates a Project Support Officer
as the cooridinator of project requirements within the di-
vision. There is direct communication between the project
management office and the field activity but the main
channel for the conduct of normal project business is
through the Project Support Officers.. Normally the field
activity has or will evolve an organization providing coun-
terparts for each project support officer involved in the
program. They function as coordinators within the field :
activity and as primary point of contact for the conduct of
project business. The systems commands and the laborator-
ies/field activities are linked at the command level through
the basic agreements and implementing task orders.
C. THE AIRTASK
When the system command has a need for in-house labora-
tory services an agreement on the scope of the work
contemplated, similar to the contracts used with private in-
dustry, is worked out through negotiations between the
principals involved on both sides. The negotiations are
less formal and complicated than those required when con-
tracting with industry. The cost in time and technical
manhours is significantly lessened and administrative steps
in providing funds and program direction are far simpler.
The field activity incorporates the proposed task into its
Laboratory Program Summary and this serves as a formal
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proposal to the systems command sponsor. The work proposed
by the field activity may be acceptable to the system com-
mand without change. In this case, the only step necessary
to implement the agreement is to make funds available by is-
suing a project order. If it is necessary to modify the work
package the systems command will prepare a task assignment
letter (AIRTASK) .
D. THE LEADING FIELD ACTIVITY
When a development requires access to technical skills or
.. ..facilities of more than one field. activity, the laboratory or
activity performing the majority of the work or the most cri-
tical function will be recognized as the leading field
activity and will be tasked with technical coordination of the
entire development effort. Project management functions are
an essential part of this task.
E. PROJECT MANAGEMENT CONTROL
It is the opinion of the authors that the existence of a
direct command relationship between the systems command
headquarters and the participating field activity is not nec-
essarily an essential factor in the management control
relationship developed under the AIRTASK concept. Control is
exercised through informal telephone contact and personal
visits more than by formal reporting procedures. Systems
commands have an interest in maintaining and improving in-
house capability for exploiting technological advances,
developing hardware and evaluating weapons systems. This is
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best done by providing the laboratories opportunity to par-
ticipate in all phases of meaningful development programs.
F. AN EXPANDED ROLE FOR THE LABORATORIES
The failure and shortcomings of the Department of Defense
systems acquisition process and a responsibility and will-
ingness to work toward a solution was expressed by Mr. David
Packard when he was appointed Deputy Secretary of Defense.
In formulating a plan to improve the acquisition process, Mr.
Packard stressed the need for improved management within the
Department of Defense... In the area of weapon systems acqusi-
tion management Mr. Packard held a conviction that
responsibility must be clarified and understood within the
services. The proper role for the office of the Secretary of
Defense is that of policy guidance and review and approval of
service programs at key decision points. The job of managing
programs is the responsibility of the services. The only way
to obtain better performance in this area was to improve the
management of programs by the military services. Responsi-





One action taken by the Department of the Navy to improve
program management resulted in the assignment of responsibil-
ity for the AGILE missile development to the Commander, Naval






Weapons Center, China Lake. This assignment evolved from
recommendations from the various study groups to make great-
er use of the in-house laboratories beginning as early as
12
the Bell Committee Report in 1962. The suggestion was also
advanced by the Report of the President's Blue Ribbon De-
13fense Panel and by the Report of the Task Group on Defense
14In-H°use Laboratories. The Chief of Naval Operations has
also advocated similar plans. .. ...
....,.•,.,,... .-.-..
The rationale behind these recommendations and the in-
tended objectives are of interest to this study. Frequently
cited has been the steady decline in the ability of the •''
systems command functional organizations to manage programs.
Loss of technical expertise has been attributed to the fail-
ure to increase manpower ceiling commensurate with the
increasing technical complexity of modern weapons. The em-
ployment of engineers to perform managerial and administrative
12 Report to the President on Government Contracting for
Research and Development
,
prepared by the Bureau of the Bud-
get and referred to the Committee on Government Operations,
United States Senate, 17 May 1962 (Bell Report).




14 Department of Defense, Report of the Task Group on De-
fense In-House Laboratories, Annex A, 1 July 1971.
Department of the Navy, Chief of Naval Operations Memo,





functions is also a frequent complaint as is the reluctance
of heads of technical branches to dedicate enough talented
personnel to programs. Another contributing factor has
been the use of contractors to manage development programs.
This was an essential part of the process during the total
package procurement era that has led to the present weakness.
One final factor affecting project managers is that the
Naval Air Systems Command is oriented toward support of
•large, costly, high visibility airframe developments at the
expense of smaller programs. Managers of the minor projects
are at a disadvantage when competing for resources, partic-
ularly for services of technical support personnel. The
smaller programs do not generate enough work to require ded-
icated personnel, and the engineers devoting part time effort
are often removed and replaced without consulting the project
manager. Frequently, when a major project runs into trouble,
the manager of a small project will find that all his support
from the technical branches has temporarily vanished.
Assigning management responsibility to the laboratories
and field activities is expected to have a beneficial effect
on their overall performance. One of the recommendations of
the Task Group on In-house Laboratories was to: "Provide
each laboratory with the capability of managing programs
across the full spectrum of the research, development and en-
gineering activities involved in fielding hardware subsystems
Report to the President and the Secretary of Defense on
the Department of Defense by the Blue Ribbon Defense Panel,






and small systems in response to operational needs. Also
cited was the "lack of full utilization of the talent and
expertise in the laboratories and the lack of enough chal-
lenging assignments to fully stimulate and motivate their
, „18people .
By unifying the responsibility for technical and mana-
gerial decision making on in-house developments the
participating laboratory is given the ability, within broad
management guidelines, to make major decisions on the spot,
free from remote meddling. Other benefits expected from in-
creased laboratory participation include a better understanding
of the cost elements of weapon systems development through
analysis of the data generated by the Navy Industrial Fund ac-
counting system. This information will also generate a standard against
which to compare costs of research and development conducted
in private industry. Exposure to project management disciplines on
a routine basis is expected to enhance the laboratories performance
as technical advisors through the transfusion into the laboratories
of a greater awareness of what problems need to be solved and
the mechanisms needed to carry systems through to operational status.
Briefly, these were the factors that entered into the de-
cision to locate AGILE management at the Naval Weapons Center,
China Lake. With the purposes and goals of field management
of a weapon systems acquisition thus established, the stage
is set for examination of the AGILE project.
Department of Defense , Report of the Task Croup on Defense In-
House Laboratories
, 1 July 1971, p. 13.
18
Department of Defense, Report of the Task Group on Defense In-House
Laboratories , Annex A., 1 July 1971.
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IV. THE AGILE DEVELOPMENT
A. BACKGROUND
With the United States' military involvement in South-
east Asia, the need for improving our air-to-air missile
capability became imperative. In response to the Southeast
Asia air-to-air threat, a Tentative Specific Operational Re-
quirement (TSOR 16-23T).was issued in May 1967 for the
development of a weapon system designated SHAPSHOT. Proposed
Technical Approach (PTA WW16-23T) prepared by the Naval Air
'Systems Command with Naval Weapon Center China Lake partici-
pation responded with a short-term Sidewinder missile product
improvement program. During .this same period the Naval Air
Systems Command funded a separate one year exploratory devel-
opment effort at the Naval Weapons Center for investigation
of such proposed missile concepts as QuickTurn and advanced
seeker designs that eventually evolved into the AGILE, or
AIM- 95 program.
The Air Force. offered yet another answer to the Southeast
Asia air-to-air threat. The Air Force AIM- 82 missile was a
possible candidate system for both Air Force and Navy use.
It was the Navy's position that the immediate need for a
short range air-to-air missile could best be met by a modified
Sidewinder with an IOC of FY 1969. The AIM-82, which had not
yet entered engineering development and AGILE, which would
fulfill long range requirements, were further downstream- A
study, conducted jointly by the Naval Weapons Center, China
Lake and Wright-Patterson Air Force Ease to determine the
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interim missile configuration found that the Sidewinder mod-
ification would result in appreciably lower development cost
as well as shorter time to IOC.
In August 1970, joint Air Force-Navy recommendations re-
garding the development of air-to-air missiles for use on
aircraft of both services were presented to Deputy Secretary
of Defense Packard. The recommendations were that the Air
Force AIM-82 program be terminated and the improved Sidewinder
be developed by the Navy to meet the short term requirements
of both services. The Navy would be the lead service for the
AGILE missile advanced development while the Air Force would
pursue high energy laser technology. The Air Force would fund
the first twelve months of the planned twenty eight month
Sidewinder development with monies from the cancelled AIM-82
program. These recommendations were concurred in by the
Deputy Secretary of Defense and Development Concept Paper
(DCP 15) for an advanced air-to-air missile was prepared in
February 1970.
In approving DCP 15, the Deputy Secretary of Defense di-
rected that, in addition to performing system definition
studies and advanced development for the new dogfight mis-
sile, full consideration should be given to upgrading an
existing missile as a low -risk interim step. This has re-
mained the fallback position throughout the program.
Work on the various aspects of missile development was
being performed by several functional groups at the Naval
Weapons Center and at other Navy and Air Force Installations.
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In April 1971, by memorandum addressed to the Chief of Naval
Operations and the Chief of Naval Material, Dr. Robert A.
Frosch, Director of Navy Research, Development, Test and
Evaluation, directed that management responsibility for AGILE
development through prototype testing be assigned directly
to Naval Weapons Center, with the longer term problem of pilot
line and production procurement to be accomplished jointly
.... 19
with the Naval Air Systems Command. This assignment pre- .
.sented both the Naval Weapons Center and the Naval Air Systems
Command with several organizational problems. While the as-
signment of responsibility is clear and explicit, there was ' •:
not at that time, nor is there now, an organizational rela-
tionship through which the responsibility is discharged. The
agreement between the Commander, Naval Weapons Center and the
Commander, Naval Air Systems Command, discussed in the fol-
lowing section, is an attempt to define a working relationship
In July, 1972, Dr. John S. Foster, Jr., Director of De-
fense Research and Engineering, approved and forwarded a
revised version of DCP 15 for the AGILE Advanced Short-Range
20Air-to-Air Missile. This action, taken with the concurrence
of Deputy Secretary Packard had the effect of waiving the re-
quirement for Defense System Acquisition Review Council
19 Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Research and Develop-
ment) Memorandum of 26 April 1971, op. cit. .
2 Department of Defense, Dcveolpment Concept Pnpcr // 1 5 ,




approval to enter the Validation Phase. Dr. Foster ex-
pressed concern for the conduct of the AGILE development and
imposed a requirement for a quarterly report on the general
status of the program and certain key development issues.
Validation effort thus far has been focused on demon-
strating the feasibility of new concepts to be incorporated
in AGILE through a program of component hardware development
and testing. Although an appreciable portion of the valida-
tion effort is being conducted in-house, private industry has
played an active role in component design. In high risk areas
such as seeker design, parallel development has been obtained
by funding independent exploratory developments be several
contractors. The product of the validation phase will be the
baseline missile configuration for the engineering design
phase. This will be a preliminary design, expected to undergo
21further refinement during engineering development. Based
on this design however, the Navy will request approval to en-
ter full scale development phase.
B. THE NAVAL WEAPONS CENTER-NAVAL AIR SYSTEMS COMMAND
AGREEMENT
1 . Background
Although the role of the Naval Weapons Center in the
AGILE program is similar in most respects to that in other
missile system developments in which the Naval Weapons Center
acted as leading field activity, there is an important
21 Naval Weapons Center, Head, ACILE Development Division,
Memorandum 302/WFC:lb, Serial 54, to File, Subject: TVC Mis-
sile Design, Development and Test , 19 April 1972 (Rev. 1, 25
April 1972), p. 1.
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difference. The Naval Air Systems Command retains the re-
sponsibility for pilot and production procurement and all
the support requirements for fleet introduction. However,
the Naval Weapons Center has been given responsibility for
"design and development through prototype test and evalua-
22tion." This responsibility goes beyond the Naval Weapons
Center's familiar function of technical direction. Manage-
ment of AGILE will require a great deal' more managerial '•
acumen than that required in any single program at the Naval
Weapons Center to date. AGILE is a major weapons system ac-
quisiton in the eyes of the Office of the Secretary of
Defense and, as such, can expect high visibility exposure at
all levels of government.
In line, perhaps, with the current Department of De-
fense philosophy of decentralized, participative management,
Dr, Frosch, in assigning responsibility for AGILE, did not
specify the management techniques or mechanisms to be used in
implementing the program. The task of developing a system-
atic managerial approach for AGILE was left to the Naval
Material Command and the Naval Weapons Center. In recognition
of the problems inherent in the divided management responsi-
bility imbedded in the arrangement prescribed by Dr. Frosch
and the need for a clearer understanding of the working re-
lationships involved, the Commander, Naval Air Systems
2 2 Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Research and Develop-
ment) Memorandum of 26 April 1971, op. cit . .
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Command entered into an agreement with the Commander, Naval
Weapons Center for the Advanced Development and Prototype
Test and Evaluation Programs for AGILE missile weapon system.
This agreement is included in Appendix B. The agreement
specifies the organizational relationships to be used by AGILE
management and details the responsibility for the various
project management tasks to be accomplished. The assignment
.•'. 23
made in Dr. Frosch's' memorandum was rather vague as to the
reporting relationships intended. Even the obvious question
of who the Naval Weapons Center was to be responsible t_o for
AGILE was not answered. The agreement places the Naval Air''*
Systems Command directly in the chain of authority for all
phases of the program. ' '•
2 . Specified Organizational Relationships
Figures IV-1 and IV-2 diagram the management relation-
ships between the Naval Air Systems Command and the Naval
Weapons Center as envisioned in their agreement on the AGILE
program. The relationship established by the negotiated
agreement links the Commander, Naval Air Systems Command and
the Commander of the Naval Weapons Center in the same manner
as other development programs. Through this agreement, the
Commander, Naval Weapons Center is responsible to the Com-
mander, Naval Air Systems Command for the functions specified
in the agreement.





through the channels indicated by light solid lines in Fig-
ure IV-1. This is envisioned as the main link between the
Systems Command and the Weapons Center and through the Wea-
pons Center to the other field activities or contractors in
the AGILE program. The Project Coord inator /Manager in the
Naval Air Systems Command and the Development Manager in the
Naval Weapons Center organization are equal and mutually
supporting positions. During the phases of the development
program when the Development Manager is directly controlling
the design effort, the responsible Naval Air Systems Command
officer will be known as the Project Coordinator and will
provide liaison with higher authority in connection with
AGILE management and progress reporting. The staff and sup-
port personnel will act as consultants as required by the
Naval Weapons Center Development Manager. At the time AGILE
is released to pilot production, the Project Coordinator is
to assume Project Manager status and primary responsibility
for all portions of the project. The Project Manager /Coor-
dinator does not enter directly into the decision process
during the development phases but he is specifically charged
with the responsibility for program validation through in-
process reviews.
The command relationships indicated by heavy solid lines
in Figure IV-1 clearly indicate that the Commander of the
Naval Weapons Center is in the AGILE management chnin-of-
command . In actual practice, the AGILE Development Manager
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This reporting relationship, shown in Figures IV-3 and IV-4,
will be seen to have important bearing on the conduct of the
AGILE program. Figure IV-3 shows the Naval Weapons Center
internal organization for AGILE management as it was origi-
nally established. Figure IV-4 shows the same organization
after re-alignment of AGILE Branches in November 1972. These
slight changes reflect changing management concerns as the
AGILE program matures . '•• . .-.
.
• ."........
The product and functional organizational relation-
,. ships diagrammed in Figure IV-2 should, in the opinion of
the authors, be phased in by this point in the AGILE devel-
opment. The NAVAIR support team has not been fully staffed.
This could be easily corrected because the organization en-
visioned is compatablc with NAVAIR' s normal operating
procedures. The organization called for at China Lake would
be more of a problem. It replicates the Naval Air Systems
Command project/functional interfaces and requires internal
organizational change. These changes have not been made.
3 . Naval Air Systems Command Functions
Under the terms of the NAVAIR-NWC Agreement the Naval
Air Systems Command remains responsible for the development,
production and support of the AGILE Weapon System. Specific
functions reserved for the Project Coordinator and other
NAVAIR personnel are long range planning, preparation,
review and justification of programming, budget and apportion-
ment estimates for the total AGILE Program, validation of the
prototype data package, configuration control and liaison
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4. MANAGEMENT FUNCTIONS ASSIGNED TO THE NAVAL WEAPONS
CENTER
The Naval Weapons Center is responsible for financial
management for assigned portions of the program, preparation
and updating of program control documentation, contracting
for all procurements undertaken in support of the develop-
ment through prototype phase, final selection of contractors
for prototype production subject to approval by higher au-
thority, and intra-pro j ec t and inter-service liaison.
Liaison with aircraft and related equipment contractors will
be arranged by the Project Coordinator, NWC also performs
cost estimating, integrated logistics support management and
makes progress and technical reports as required by the Naval
Air Systems Command.
C. CURRENT STATUS
1 . Progress in Technical Areas
The AGILE program is in the later stages of Advanced
Development and the time for a decision to proceed to En-
gineering Development is rapidly approaching. Preparation
for DSARC II involved a considerable amount of hardware test
and evaluation, simulation studies and trade-off studies to
arrive at an engineering baseline missile design. Due to
recent decreases in Navy research and development funding,
work schedules have been revised. The scope of the test and
evaluation program has been decreased and scheduled comple-
tion has been postponed. Due to the fluctuations in current
funding and its impact on program schedule, an exact
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definition of AGILE's position in the acquisition cycle is
not possible. It is sufficient to note that its current
status would lend a feeling of urgency to all efforts as-
sociated with the program
A unique element in the AGILE program is the formal
technical review conducted in-house by the Naval Weapons
Center as a precondition for approval for engineering devel-
opment. This review by the NWC Design Review Committee will
logically be conducted prior to DSARC II and will examine
two areas that are DSAR.C concerns: the feasibility of the
proposed AGILE design approach' and the adequacy of the en- '"'"'•
gineering baseline missile design.
2 . Management Emphasis
In contrast to the in-house review the milestone
DSARC review (DSARC II) and an interim Management Review held
the week of 4 March 1973 placed heavy emphasis on program
management considerations. At the time for DSARC II, AGILE
management will be required to address specific program par-
ameters such as unit production costs and life cycle costs,
maintainability, suppor tabili ty and other Integrated Logistic
24Support elements. However, the emphasis being placed on
program management is best demonstrated by two OSD initiated
demands. The first is a requirement for a quarterly progress
report to the Director of Defense Research and Engineering
on key program management issues. The second is the
24
DCP 15 , op. cit . .
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previously mentioned management review. 'The intent of the
latter review is to evaluate the way the Navy is conducting
this development and, due to the way the AGILE program man-
agement has been structured, NWC China Lake will receive
most of the attention.
3 . Industry Participation
The AGILE Technical Development Plan and other program
planning documents contemplate extensive industry participa-
tion in both Advanced Development and Engineering Development,
.Industry has played a major role in the design of system and
sub-system components under the guidance and technical direc-
tion of the NWC. In areas of high risk, several promising
developments have been funded on a competitive basis for in-
dustry development independent of the NWC design efforts.
AGILE planning calls for the selection of a single
contractor to act as principle support contractor during the
latter states of Advanced Development. The principle support
contractor will be the prime contractor for the missile gui-
dance system and will assist NWC in preparing for Engineering
Development and during that stage will be tasked with the
systems integration responsibility. The principle support
contractor will be responsible for integrating the design ef-
forts of prime and sub-contractors to achieve a low cost,
producable design. The Request for Proposals (RFP) for this
contract was issued by the Navy Regional Purchase Office Los
Angeles on 15 September 1972. Five contractors submitted pro-
posals. The source selection process currently underway has
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narrowed the field to two. Source selection evaluation
board consists of personnel from the Naval Weapons Center,
Naval Weapons Test Center, and the Naval Air Systems Com-
mand. Source Selection Advisory Council members include
NAVAIR representation but final selection authority is re-
tained by the Chief of Naval Material.
4 . The Naval Air Systems Command Role
Under the terms of the agreement between the Naval
Air Systems Command and the Naval Weapons Center, NAVAIR re-
tains responsibility for the AGILE program but its role in
the management of the program at this stage in minimal. The - ,:
main NAVAIR responsibility is assuring that the thresholds,
program directions and other requirements imposed by higher
authority are observed. The way this responsibility is
carried out varies with the circumstances. An officer in
the NAVAIR Material Acquisition Division, identified as the
project coordinator nominally has this responsibility. He
is assigned to the Air-to-Air Missile Branch and is the only
individual who is assigned exclusively to the AGILE program.
He functions without staff, charter, nor the visibility of
an identified project manager. His task is made difficult
by the lack of clearly defined communications channels.
There is no systematic reporting of program data. Informa-
tion is obtained on an as needed basis.
Under the concept set forth in the NWC-NAVAIR agreement,
the AGILE development manager at NWC reports directly to the
AGILE program coordinator in NAVAIR. The normal flow of
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technical information through project support officers in
various functional branches is bypassed. The NAVAIR func-
tional divisions are available to act in a consulting
capacity with technical direction originating in the China
Lake organization. In the opinion of the authors it is not
surprising to find that China Lake, given the opportunity to
function independently, has foregone such support and the
attendent risk of NAVAIR-imposed constraints.
5 . The NWC AGILE Project Organization
The Naval Weapons Center has evolved a management
program for the AGILE program that' is fully integrated in
their existing organization. The Development Manager reports
to the head of the Weapons Systems Development Department.
He has line authority over the branches dedicated to AGILE
but depends in part on the support of the functionally-organ-
ized departments of the Naval Weapons Center. The NWC AGILE
program organization is best described as a hybrid project-
matrix adapted to the Weapons Center's traditional ways of
doing business. The position of the development manager
within the China Lake organization does not allow him full
authority over program decisions. The investigation dis-
closed that program technical decisions are on occasion made
by higher echelons of management.
The Development Manager in practice performs the functions
of technical manager of the AGILE project. The individual
assigned to the job has excellent qualifications as an engi-
neer and technical manager but little experience with
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acquisition program management as contrasted to technical
management. He has relied heavily on the Project Management
Plans and Programs Branch for this function.
Since the AGILE project was staffed from personnel
already employed at China Lake, the individual initially as-
signed as head of the Project Management Plans and Programs
Branch was also an engineer with greater technical than
managerial qualifications. The history of project manage-
ment can be divided into two distinct periods: the first
period beginning with the inception of AGILE at China Lake,
ended with the replacement of the head of the Project Man-
agement Plans and Programs Branch in November 1972. The
second period begins with the appointment of an experienced
procurement or iented
.
manager to the position.
During the first period, project management was es-
sentially viewed as a record keeping and accounting process.
The head of the Project Management Plans and Programs Branch
functions on the same level as the other branch heads re-
porting to the AGILE division head. The position did not
carry with it the authority to manage program funds. Each
branch head exercised this authority for his branch indepen-
dently under general guidelines laid out by the Development
Manager
.
One rather surprising aspect of AGILE management at
China Lake is the relegation of the majority of contact with
outside agencies to the Management Plans and Programs Branch
Head. It is the authors' opinion that this has come about
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because the Development Manager is so strongly oriented to-
ward the technical disciplines. In practice the AGILE
Management Plans and Programs Branch Head has been handi-
capped in dealing with outside inquiries by his lack of
authority to make program commitments of any significance.
During the early period of AGILE's existence at China
Lake as a full-fledged program, roughly from April 1971 to
November 1972, the individual assigned as head of the Man-
agement Plans and Programs Branch was an engineer with little
experience or exposure to the broad concept of project man-
agement. He accepted the assignment with the understanding
that he would have to "learn the ropes" as the program pro-
gressed. The fact that'he did not fully realize the scope
and importance of many of the program management elements
and disciplines is not surprising. As a consequence, the in-
formation needs of higher authority were seldom anticipated.
Inquiries and requests for information such as impact state-
ments invariably touched off a flurry of activity which,
quite naturally, inconvenienced and annoyed other branch
managers. It was obvious that a qualified manager was a
vital necessity for AGILE success.
The present head of the Management Plans and Programs
Branch, now titled the Systems Management Branch, has qual-
ifications based on a military career in the weapons system
acquisition field. He has brought to the job a systems ap-
proach to project management. He is aware of the many
requirements imposed on project management, appreciates their
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significance and interrelationships. His most valuable con-
tribution to the program thus far is in the area of planning.
The integration of the many local planning functions in a
master program plan allows the establishment of a data col-
lection and reporting system that provides accurate and
current information. The introduction of a computer-based
Management Information system in the last several months has
proceeded at a rapid pace. Its implementation and acceptance
is aided appreciably by the System Management Branch Head's
efforts to obtain cooperation of the branch heads. His per-
sonal stature is such that he exerts appreciable influence
in the AGILE program well beyond the limits of his authority.
He has the talent of anticipating the needs of NAVAIR and
realizes the importance of a close working relationship with
AGILE organization. The results of his effort are beginning
to be realized in many important areas. The most recent
achievement was successful outcome of the OASD management
review of AGILE management. The review, conducted in early
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On 26 April 1971, the Assistant Secretary of the
Navy for Research and Development released a memorandum
which set forth his decision to place the management respon-
sibility for the development of the AGILE missile through
engineering development at the Naval Weapons Center, China
Lake. This action constituted a change to the usual weapon
systems acquisition process in the Navy in which the spon-
soring systems command exercises overall responsibility for
program management. The change created a new set of program
management requirements in addition to those normally en-
countered. The new management concept required action to
be taken at the Naval Weapons Center and at the various Navy
commands concerned with the systems acquisition process.
AGILE program management will be evaluated on the basis of
how well these requirements were met. Specific management
plans, decisions and actions considered important and nec-
sary by the authors will be used as a basis for evaluation.
Within this framework, the management criteria specified in
Chapter I of this paper will be applied in examining AGILE
management's performance.
The management functions of planning, organizing, staf-
fing, control, communicating and directing will be looked at
on the Navy headquarters level as well as at the working lev-
el at China Lake. Although the effect of decisions made at
the Office of the Secretary of Defense help shape the course
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of the AGILE program, this study will treat them as exter-
nal constraints and confine itself to Navy management
effectiveness .
Within the Navy, the offices and agencies found to ex-
ercise the greatest control and influence in matters
concerning AGILE were the Office of the Assistant Secretary
of the Navy for Research and Development, the Naval Air Sys-
tems Command Headquarters and logically, the Naval Weapons
Center, China Lake. The focus of this evaluation is these
three organizations.
During this discussion, frequent reference is made to
information and opinions learned during interviews conduc-
ted by the authors. In most cases it proved impossible to
document the data obtained in this way. The value placed
on opinion is a matter for individual judgement in each case
and the statements of opinion are included to provide a
feeling for the managerial climate of the AGILE project, not
for their intrinsic worth. In a surprising number of cases,
the views expressed were shared by a number of knowledgable
Defense officials. A complete list of all officials inter-
viewed in included as Appendix A.
B. PLANNING FOR CHANGE
In the opinion of the authors, a detailed plan for im-
plementing decentralized project management was a
prerequisite for ACILE's new management structure. Planning
for any change is a necessity. Because there is no
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precedent in which AGILE management can find guidance, even
more intensive and careful planning was indicated.
Planning for a change is a two sided effort. First, the
policies, procedures and organizational modifications neces-
sary to implement the change must be developed. This
requirement will be covered in a subsequent section. The
second part of the effort is the planning necessary to en-
sure that the change will be accepted within the organization,
•Change, unless its objectives and effect on individuals and
working groups is understood, will be resisted. Understand-
ing is the key to avoiding resistance to change. Policies
and objectives should be disclosed in such a manner that the
personnel responsible for implementing them at the working
level can understand and identify with them. People who will
be strongly affected by the change should have a voice in
formulating the plan of action. Planning for the AGILE pro-
gram should have been accomplished with the participation of
working level personnel in the Naval Air Systems Command and
the Naval Weapons Center.
The objective and intent of the decision to place AGILE
management in the field was never clearly stated. The over-
all objectives of the change, as understood by the authors
based on interviews with program officials, are still not
entirely clear, nor are they documented. In interviews and
in the study of AGILE program documents, no evidence was
discovered that an attempt was made to explain the rationale
of the decision to the personnel who would be affected, nor
6 5

to involve them in planning for the changes to come. Mr.
H. D. Wilson, Technical Director of the Naval Weapons Cen-
ter, for example, was unable to provide the authors with an
explanation. This circumstance supports the authors' con-
tention that the people who were to carry out the decision
were not privy to its formulation nor its intent.
The decision to place management of the AGILE develop-
ment at the Naval Weapons Center could be expected to, and
. did meet with resistance at the Naval Air Systems Command
^.••'Headquarters. The AGILE program had existed in the concep-
tual stage in the Naval Air Systems Command Research and
Technology Directorate and was being supported by the func-
tional divisions of the Material Acquisition Directorate.
The decision encroached upon the traditional prerogatives of
the systems command, threatening to erode its authority over
an important program. Implicitly, the decision acknowledged
the diminishing technical competence of the NAVAIR functional
divisions and threatened to further degrade that ability.
The planning and implementation of the change should have in-
cluded an effort to gain greater understanding and support
in the Naval Air Systems Command.
Part of the process of planning is the selection of pro-
gram goals and objectives and determining the criteria to be
used in the decision making process. By allowing working
level managers charged with responsibility for achieving
those goals to participate in the planning process, their un-
derstanding and support is assured.
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C. PLANNING FOR DECENTRALIZATION
Current Department of Defense policy is that the re-
sponsibility and authority for the acquisition of major
defense systems be decentralized to the maximum practicable
extent consistent with the urgency and importance of each
program. The AGILE program is an attempt at decentraliza-
tion with much of the decision authority vested in the
working level personnel at China Lake. Its unusual struc-
ture and lack of precedent has given management the right
,,' • .to deviate from broad DoD guidelines.
.
The need for .flexi-
bility is patent. • ".••• ' • '•.'•'
One possible objective of the AGILE program management
structure mentioned during several interviews was to by-pass
the layers of authority that comprise the Navy's acquisition
management establishment, thus pushing the decision-making
responsibility to the lowest practicable working level. On
the surface, the AGILE mode of project management appears to
do this. Secretary Frosch's memorandum seems to create a
decentralized management structure by simply cutting AGILE's
ties to the NAVAIR technical and functional branches. De-
centralization, however to be practical, requires something
more. The decision to decentralize should be based on com-
parison of the advantages and costs of decentralization and
a carefully formulated plan for implementation.
It does not appear that this question was treated in a
systematic way in the AGILE program. The apparent advantages




by numerous studies. The logic of in-house engineering
development was noted repeatedly during interviews with Navy
managers and research personnel as well. However, no at-
tempt has been made to quantify the gains expected or the
costs involved.
As stated in the introduction four essential steps must
be taken when decentralizing authority and responsibility:
f unc
t
ionaliza t ion of planning and control; determining pre-
cise lines of authority and responsibility; clear definition
of. how managers at lower levels can participate in planning
and developing methods of control which are adapted to the
need for coordinated action in a decentralized organization.
The only program document discovered that addresses any of
these planning functions is the Naval Air Systems Command -
Naval Weapons Center working agreement. It clarifies
authority relationships to a certain degree. The three re-
maining requirements are left unsatisfied.
D. ORGANIZATION AND STAFFING
When the functions and responsibilities of the billets
in an organization and their relationship to other billets
and functions are clearly defined, there is little opportu-
nity for personality clashes to impede the routine flow of
The Report of the Task Group on Defense In-House Labor-
atories in 1971, Appendix E to the Blue Ribbon Defense Panel
Report in 1972, the Defense Science Board Task Force on R&D
management in 1969, and the Bell Report in 1962, for example,
contain arguments favoring in-house development.
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work. Conversely, when jobs are ill-defined, misunderstand-
ings are frequently a cause of conflict. The AGILE program
did not fit into the existing organizational structure and
depends to a large extent on a spirit of cooperation to
avoid conflict. This situation arises because functional
responsibilities concerning the AGILE program were not
clearly defined at the outset.
The problem has not been completely ignored. An attempt
to clarify authority and responsibilities resulted in the
COMNAVAIR-COMNAVWPNCEN Agreement Concerning the Advanced
Development and Prototype Test and Evaluation Program for
AGILE Guided Weapon System. The text of the agreement is
included as Appendix B. The agreement is not in itself a
complete plan for the conduct of the AGILE program. It es-
tablished policy and guidance to be used in formulating a
management plan. Since the AGILE program had no precedent,
existing organizational relationships were modified to meet
current needs. The modifications, made for the express pur-
pose of satisfying ASN(R&D) requirements, were minimal. The
drafters of the agreement maintain that where it appears to
27
be vague or ambiguous, it is so of necessity. The parti-
cipants in the AGILE program would need latitude in resolving
problems as yet unforeseen. Inflexible provisions acting as
constraints on AGILE management would weaken the program.
Under the terms of the agreement, the Naval Air Systems
Command retains responsibility for coordinating long-range
planning for the AGILE program, including primary liaison with
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Congress, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and higher
echelons of Navy command. A Program Coordinator has been
designated to act as a point of contact for all inquiries
concerning AGILE. He is the AGILE program spokesman in the
Washington arena. He coordinates the headquarters manage-
ment function for AGILE. Although this is a task of
considerable magnitude, the Program Coordinator is the only
individual serving AGILE in a dedicated billet in the Naval
Air Systems Command. In actual practice, the billet has not
proved effective. The Program Coordinator is hampered by
insufficient staff support.' He does not have convenient ac-
cess to program data necessary to the performance of his
liaison function. He has not exploited informal contacts to
compensate for his lack of formal organizational authority.
The billet does not have the official status of a chartered
project manager and is frequently bypassed in the press of
urgent program decisions.
Department of Defense Instruction 5000.1 expresses con-
cern for the assignment and tenure of program managers.
Program managers are to be given certain career incentives
and will remain in their billets long enough to be effective,
The program manager must feel responsibility for and be held
accountable for the downstream effects of his management de-
cisions. The way the AGILE development is structured makes
this an impossibility. No one individual is clearly respon-
sible for the AGILE program at this point and a project
manager, when chartered, cannot be held accountable for the
results of decisions being made now.
70

The problem lies in the concept of the Program Coordi-
nator billet. At the time AGILE enters full scale
production, the Program Coordinator will be designated as
AGILE Project Manager. An individual with the drive and de-
termination to be a successful project manager would
naturally be dissatisfied with the more passive role of the
Program Coordinator. Knowing that he will eventually have
responsibility for the outcome of decisions being made at
China Lake, he will attempt to influence them and AGILE man-
agement at China can be expected to resent his intrusion.
The Program Coordinator has very little authority over the''.'.'
AGILE decision-making process and no authority to make pro-
gram commitments. His effectiveness depends on his ability
to persuade and influence managers currently in positions of
authority.
The NAVAIR Program Coordinator's position would be un-
settling to management scholars. The organizational structure
of the AGILE program at China Lake would be no less so. The
AGILE organization at China Lake is a hybrid organization
heavily oriented toward the project/product organizational
form. The AGILE Development Manager reports two levels below
the level of the center Technical Director. One of the four
branches reporting to the Development Manager is now respon-
sible for overall coordination of the AGILE business
management effort. The precise number and nature of the bil-
lets in this branch has varied over the life of the program







responsibility for interfaces with all activities outside
China Lake has shifted to this office. In the past the
function of this branch was limited to fiscal accounting
and record keeping. Its role in planning and control has
resulted from a gradual evolution.
To function properly the head of the systems management
branch must have authority to direct that actions taken by
other line branch heads conform to the program management
plan. Since he is at the same level in the organization, he
has no line authority to do this. He must depend upon the
informal organization to achieve his goals.- ''The authors be- "
lieve that there should be a Project Manager with clearly
defined formal authority to perform these functions.
The assumption of AGILE management responsibility im-
posed unique additional staffing requirements of the China
Lake organization. In the opinion of the authors, provisions
for new billet requirements and changes to the organizational
structure left much to be desired. Detailed plans for tran-
sition should address personal and organizational requirements
as well as the technical aspects of the program. In planning
for decentralized operation it is imperative that the skills
and competence of the subordinate managers be determined and,
where necessary, improved prior to execution of the decen-
tralization plan.
It is a policy of the Department of Defense that the de-
velopment and production of a major defense system shall be
managed by a single individual chartered with sufficient
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authority to accomplish program objectives. If that indi-
vidual is a competent manager, many of the problems of
program management will be avoided. The AGILE development
is not structured to take advantage of a good manager's
talents. Authority and responsibility are fragmented. A
change in management is built into the. program at the criti-
cal point where production is initiated. The fact that no
individual has been chartered as AGILE Project Manager is,
in the opinion of the authors, a major weakness. A charter
setting forth authority and responsibility, issued by high
authority''-would provide ' sure footing for the AGILE manager"•'•"'"• ' *"«,
in dealing with the conflicting demands of those agencies
having interest in AGILE. The authors believe that the
chartering authority for AGILE should be the Chief of Naval
Material. A program manager reporting at that level would
be able to resolve questions of concern to both the Naval
Air Systems Command and the Naval Weapons Center while still
preserving the integrity of the existing chain of command
and channels of communications. Chartering by the Chief of
Naval Material would have the added advantage of conforming
to another principle set forth in Department of Defense In-
struction 5000.1. That is the requirement that layering of
authority between that program manager and the service com-
ponent head be kept to a minimum.
E. CONTROL
One of the essential factors in decentralization is the
development of a control system that is adaptable to
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management's new needs. The shift of AGILE management from
NAVAIR to NWC China Lake created a need for different con-
trol procedures. How management performance is to be
measured and by whom is one question that must be determined.
Control of funds and expenditures is yet another.
In the normal acquisition project, the designated Project
Manager, with the guidance of the chartering authority, would
be responsible for detailed control of program progress. The
Project Manager keeps tight control of program funds. Ex-
penditures are tied to project work packages and are closely
" "monitored by Program Support Officers 'assigned to' the' pro- '; •'.
ject. In the AGILE program, this headquarters control has
been bypassed
.
All AGILE funds are under the control of NWC China Lake.
Responsibility for management of the development has clearly
been assigned to NWC but the ultimate responsibility for the
AGILE Program still rests with NAVAIR. It is only logical
that some control is required at NAVAIR headquarters. The
system that has been established depends primarily upon the
forwarding of routine project reports used by the NWC Devel-
opment Manager and supplementary information furnished to the
NAVAIR Program Coordinator on request. The information flow
has not been adequate to NAVAIR control needs.
The lack of strong control procedures requires some com-
pensating mechanism if the program is to succeed. A system
that coordinates the diverse requirements and inputs and for-
ces resolution of conflicts whi. le still acknowledging the
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"independent" status of the parties to the NAVAIR-NWC agree-
ment is needed. Experience indicates the need for continued
top-level management involvement.
Perhaps the device employed in the CAPTOR program would
be the answer for AGILE. CAPTOR is similar to AGILE in that
the management of the program was relocated from a systems
command to a laboratory. Difficulties were encountered be-
cause of the number of offices and agencies with interest in
the program. Inability to achieve a unified position on pro-
gram issues and to coordinate the inputs of the various
organizations led to problems at' the working' level . ' The '
problem was solved by focusing additional high-level manage-
ment attention on the program through the formation of the
CAPTOR Steering Committee composed of high-ranking Navy of-
ficials. Such a system, although possibly inefficient in the
use of managerial time, has contributed immeasurably to CAP-
TOR's progress. Because the AGILE program does not cross as
many organizational lines, a steering committee at a lower
level might prove effective. The main obstacle to the for-
mation of such a group would be the geographical distance
between China Lake and NAVAIR headquarters.
Internal control in the AGILE program has always been
adequate for Naval Weapons Center requirements. It is being
tightened as a result of recent budget cuts. Flexible bud-
geting and close control of task assignments utilizing the




F. COMMUNICATING AND DIRECTING
In the usual Navy systems acquisition program, the pro-
ject manager obtains support requirements from the various
functional divisions and branches in the supporting systems
command. Each functional organization designates a program
support officer to act as primary point of contact for the
project within that functional area. The program support
officer coordinates all project requirements within his
functional area, including technical supervision of tasks
assigned to industry or in-house research centers. The link
between the program support officers and their counterparts • •
in the laboratories and research centers forms the primary
communications channel for the conduct of routine project
business. It also provides the headquarters command with a
readily available source of project information.
This usual interface between NAVAIR and NWC China Lake
through which the two-way flow of information is conducted
has not been established in the AGILE program due to the di-
rect delegation of authority to the NWC. No new system was
planned to take its place because, in theory, none was need-
ed. All communications were intended to flow between the
Development Manager at China Lake and the Program Coordinator
at NAVAIR with the latter acting as the link between AGILE
management at China Lake and higher echelons of Navy manage-
ment.
Because this link has been inadequate for the information
demands, the Systems Management Branch Head at China Lake
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maintains informal communications with numerous individuals
and agencies at the headquarters level. The Program Coordi-
nator at NAVAIR is frequently by-passed completely in these
exchanges. While this mode of operations allows NWC China
Lake to expedite management tasks, it has certain drawbacks.
The real need for exchange of information has not been met
in a timely and satisfactory manner. Demands for informa-
tion consume an ever-increasing amount of managerial time
and attention. Key people at China Lake are spending too
much time traveling to Washington meetings and briefings.
Bypassing the established' organization without creating a
compensating communications network violates the management
principle of unity of command.
To be effective, communications have to be accepted.
People will ignore or misunderstand a message that is in
conflict with their objectives. Since the objectives of the
Naval Air Systems Command and the Naval Weapons Center are
not in complete harmony with the decision to decentralize
program management, communications have suffered. However,
top level management in both organizations appear to be de-
termined to make the program work. The "brute force" of
top management involvement is being brought to bear in order




The decision to place management responsibility for the
AGILE missile development at the Naval Weapons Center, China
Lake had several objectives not directly related to the task
of creating a new weapon system. These included improving
the center's managerial capabilities, learning more about
development costs, and experimenting with decentralized
management. As far as the missile itself is concerned, it
was hoped that the decentralization would expedite the
achievement of an. initial operating capability. The program's
success in meeting these objectives will remain undetermined
until its conclusion.
Management of the AGILE development at China Lake is a
large departure from the way weapon systems acquisitions
have been managed in the Navy. The Naval Air Systems Com-
mand-Naval Weapons Center working agreement is evidence that
some planning for the change was undertaken. However, it
is doubtful that the significance of the change was fully
appreciated in the planning stage. The agreement recognized
the differences between customary program management and
AGILE management but, never- the-less , attempts to force AGILE
management to conform to the existing organizational rela-
tionships, program structures, etc. In concept, AGILE comes
very close to true decentralization of management and, man-
agement theory requires basic changes in staffing, control
and communications if decentralization is to work. Failure
to prepare for and institute these changes at the outset is
one cause of present program management inefficiency.
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An important lesson to be learned from AGILE is that any
change must be carefully planned and introduced only after
carefully laying the groundwork for the new way of operating.
Of particular importance is assuring that the goals of the
organization and the individuals are compatable with those
of the project. One finding of this study is that Naval
Weapons Center personnel do not in general wish to be bur-
dened with the details of project management. Fascination
with technical details and an aversion for the mundane "bus-
iness" of project management is a typical and desirable
characteristic of research personnel, However , faced with
the task, effort should be made to identify and employ per-
sonnel with managerial talent and interest in program
supervis ion
.
The NWC China Lake AGILE organization is not structured
to achieve program objectives efficiently. The authors be-
lieve that an AGILE project manager reporting to the NWC
Technical Director should head the NWC AGILE program. The
project manager should have clear and undivided authority
over all AGILE program management and technical matters. The
authors believe that the position of the Systems Management
Branch Head in the NWC AGILE organization is a major organi-
zational shortcoming. If one accepts the premise that
financial constraints are the controlling factor in the cur-
rent weapons systems acquisition environment then the project
organization should take this fact into account. The authors
recommend that AGILE be directed by a chartered project
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manager. As an interim measure, it is recommended that the
position of the Systems Management Branch Head be elevated
to that of a manager with direct line authority over AGILE
technical branch managers. The discipline of program fund-
ing constraints would thus be imposed on technical decisions.
The AGILE management concept led to conflict with the
aims and goals of the Naval Air Systems Command organization.
It was very much evident in the interviews conducted at NAV-
AIR headquarters that officials in positions of authority
:."•
- believed that AGILE management should remain in the systems
command. Consequently, there was no strong motivation at the
working level within the NAVAIR organization to make the
program a success. To counteract the effects of these be-
liefs on organizational motivation, strong affirmative action
by top management is necessary. Early, positive support for
Dr. Frosch's decision if demonstrated by NAVAIR leadership
could have stimulated development of efficient working rela-
tionships throughout the program.
When the time comes to pass final judgement on the ef-
fectiveness of the Navy's conduct of the AGILE program, the
appropriate criteria, or at least one of the standards that
should be used, will be the cost-effectiveness of the weapon
system. At that time it must be realized that the present
experiment with decentralized management must involve certain
costs. Whether the additional costs stem from untried meth-
ods or inexperienced managers, they will be a burden to the
AGILE missile development program. Hopefully, those whose
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duty it is to judge these matters will take this additional
burden into consideration.
It is the opinion of the authors that the AGILE program
as it exists today will achieve its objective. The program
successfully passed a management review presented to the
Director of Defense Research and Development and other DoD
officials during the first week of March, 1973. Management
is meeting the requirements placed upon it, however, it is
inefficient and will continue to be so long as it operates
.in violation of the generally accepted management principles
previously discussed. ' ** .' • " '•' "••'•' •'-'•'' .••'.••'"•'.••'•;. •:.'•••"
Other reasons for this optimistic attitude lie outside
the realm of project management. There is a valid military
need for a short range air-to-air weapon and Navy management
exhibits determination to succeed on this project. In re-
cent months, more and more high level management attention
is being focused on the AGILE program. If enough support is
generated and enough resources are made available, success is
assured. The question of efficiency still remains.
There are strong arguments favoring this innovative ap-
proach to project management. The Navy will not improve its
management of acquisition programs unless it is willing to
try new management schemes. On the other hand, the existing
weapons systems acquisition process is effective if not al-
ways efficient. The organizational relationships, methods,
and procedures that are the cumulative result of almost thir-
ty years experience in modern systems development are an
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asset that must not be cast lightly aside. It is a serious
and costly mistake to change the existing system unless it
is expected that the benefit of the change will exceed the
cost. All levels of management must accept the fact that
costs, in terms of disruption of established organizations
and traditions as well as dollars, are. necessary for progress
On the balance, the reasons for keeping AGILE project
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(AIR-5018B).
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COMNAVAIR - COMNAVWPNSCEN Agreement Concerning the
Advanced Development and Prototype Test and Evaluation
Programs for AGILE Guided Missile Weapon System
Ref: (a) ASN (R&D) Conf memo to CNO and CNM of 26 April 1971
In keeping with the sprit and intent of reference (a),
Commander, Naval Air Systems Command will assign responsi-
bilities and delegate authority to Commander, Naval Weapons
Center for the management and conduct of the Advanced
Development and Prototype design test and evaluation phases
of the AGILE Weapon System.
The purpose of this agreement is to establish the framework











The AGILE Guided Missile Weapon System for which
NAVWPNSCEN will be assigned development management responsi-
bility includes but is not limited to the following:










a. Visual target acquisition system
b. Other Weapon Control System Elements not designed
and provided as an integral part of the using aircraft.
c. Launcher (if new development required)
d. Peculiar Ground Support Equipment
(1) For missile
(2) For Non-expendable system elements





NAVAIR will establish an AGILE Project Office as the
primary point of contact in the Naval Material Command for
the conduct of AGILE business. NAVWPNSCEN will designate a
Development Manager resident at NAVWPNSCEN who will be
responsive to the NAVAIR AGILE Project Coordinator or
Manager as appropriate under the terms of this agreement
(Figure 1 applies).
LONG RANGE PLANNING
Data required for broad AGILE planning, such as included
in the Navy Strategic Study, tentative Program Objectives
Memorandum, Weapon System Planning Documents, Material
Planning Studies, etc., will be coordinated by NAVAIR.
NAVAIR will provide such long range planning information as
may be required by NAVWPNSCEN and solicit support as may be
required for proper planning. r -' ' ''•'•' .';••.•-•*. ."<
BUDGET PREPARATION AND PROJECT FUNDING
NAVWPNSCEN will have financial management responsibilit-
ies for tbose portions of the program for which responsibil-
ity has been assigned and will provide necessary data and
cost estimates for its assigned responsibilities to NAVAIR
for program, budget and review purposes. NAVAIR will have
financial managment responsibility for the overall AGILE
Weapon System Project.
NAVAIR will prepare, review, justify and defend program-
ming, budget and apportionment estimates for the total
AGILE Program. As appropriate and required, NAVWPNSCEN
representatives will be called upon to supply data and
provide back-up witnesses.
The entire amount of project funds requried and appor-
tioned for support of the NAVWPNSCEN effort previously
agreed to by both parties and expressed in the current
version of the development plan will be made available to
NAVWPNSCEN in a singel funding document issued by NAVAIR
each year at the time of apportionment.
PROGRAM CONTROL DOCUMENTATION
NAVWPNSCEN will be responsible for the preparation and
updating of the following essential documents:
(1) The Technical Development Plan (Adv. Dev.) -
(Applicable to Concept Formulation (Validation) effort and




(2) The Technical Development Plan (TDP) - (Applicable
to Engineering Development . One of the Major outputs of the
Advanced Development Program)
.
(3) The Advanced Procurement Plan (APP) - (Covers all
contemplated contractual actions for the entire program
span up to and including first competitive r eprocur ement or
first volume procurement, whichever is sooner).
(4) The Performance Specification - (Performance spec-
ifications for the system, major subsystems and elements
of the system to be developed and prototyped as GFE items
are required as an output of the Validation effort and prior
to release to prototype procurement).
(5) The Development Concept Paper - (Draft and review
as requried). ...
The above items Will be prepared by NAVWPNSCEN and sub-
mitted through NAVAIR and updated on a timely basis. Items
1, 2, 3, and 4 are subject to NAVAIR concurrence or approval
as appropriate. All items will be used a s program control
documents
.
Requirements for the preparation of these documents will
be delineated in the applicable AIRTASK assignments.
INDUSTRIAL PARTICIPATION
Developments of hardware or software for service use,
beginning with the prototype program will be accomplished by
NAVWPNSCEN or participating field activities working with and
through industrial concerns capabl e of producing the quality
and quantity of hardware needed for service use, at the
desired rates. This industrial participation will be such
that at the initiation of the prototype phase one of the
participants can be designated as the weapon system or
system integration contractor who, under the technical
direction of NAVWPNSCEN, will:
(1) Evolve the production baseline configuration of the
so-called contractor furnished portions of the weapon system.
(2) Participate in the performance of the system inte-
gration function by assisting in the development, establish-
ment and management of total system configuration and the
maintenance of CFE-to-CFE and weapon system-to-aircraft and
carrier interfaces. The items of equipment and software to
be developed as GFE will be determined by NAVWPNSCEN and treated
appropriately in the APP. The number of such items will be





Contracting for all procurements undertaken in support
of the development program through the prototype phase will
be accomplished by NAVWPNSCEN using procedures and contract-
ing offices of their own choosing. Source selection will be
accomplished by NAVWPNSCEN in accordance with CNM approved
procedures. Final selection of contractors for prototype
production must be concurred in by NAVAIR before announce-
ment. A designated representative of the NAVAIR Project
Coord ina tor /Manager will participate in all selections of
prototype equipment contractors as a member of the source
selection evaluation board or its equivalent.
DATA ACQUISITION
: The end product of the NAVWPNSCEN-managed development
program will be a proven prototype data package which wil
provide for or support '• • ;•'.' • '.
a. A release to Pilot Production by the Prototype
contractor., . •.-..- .... ... ••;'
b. Inspection and acceptance of pilot production end
items
c. Installation in test and evaluation aircraft
a. Operation by test and evaluation personnel
e. Maintenance and repair by Navy test and evaluation
organizations
The NAVAIR Project Coordinator /Manager will validate
this data package through in-process reviews.
CONFIGURATION CONTROL
Configuration Control for the advanced development
period will be against the stated objectives of the ADO
(Advanced Development Objective). For the early engineering
development period beginning witli prototype procurement and
extending to the point of release to pilot production or
delivery of first hardware for NTE, whichever is sooner,
control will be agianst the performance specification or
funcitonal baseline established in the advanced development
(validation) program. The configuration control for pilot
production will be against the product baseline disclosure
provided in the release to pilot production. Deviations
from the baseline configurations delineated above will







a. Intra-Pro j ec t Liaison . All visits to participating
field activities and contractors by personnel other than
those reporting directly to the NAVWPNSCEN Development
Manager will be coordinated with the NAVWPNSCEN Development
Manager prior to their occurrence.
b. Inter-Sarvice Technical Liaison . The NAVWPNSCEN
Development Manager will conduct direct liaison with the Air
Force on technical matters and will provide facilities for
local Air Force liaison and/or technical representatives.
All project action requriements levied upon the Air Force
in the course of this development will be implememted with




-c . Liaison witb Higher Authorities . NAVAIR will provide
primary liaison with CMN , OPNAV, SECNAV, OSD and Congress
relative to management of and progress reporting on the
AGILE Project. The NAVWPNSCEN Development Manager will be
called upon to supply information and provide back-up
support. He will, provide technical presentations, as
appropriate. •'
d . Liaison with Aircraft and Related Equipment Contract -
ors . The NAVAIR Project Coord ina tor /Manager will arrange
for access of appropriate NAVWPNSCEN Project personnel to
NAVAIR contractors for aircraft and related euqipment and
will take all steps necessary to assure early detection of
compatibility problems and their expeditious resolution.
COST ESTIMATING
The NAVWPNSCEN Development Manager will prepare and keep
current, a detailed cost estimate for the complete develop-
ment, test and evaluation program and will assist NAVAIR in
the generation and update of production cost estimates.
The cost model used for these estimates will be worked out
in conjunction with and approved by the NAVAIR Project
Coordinator/ Manager.
INTEGRATED LOGISTIC SUPPORT
The NAVWPNSCEN Development Manager will coordinate all
logistic support management planning and implementation with
NAVAIR based on the procedures of NAVAIR Instruction 4000.2.
He will provide a cochairman for the ILSMT (Integrated





The NAVWPNSCEN Development Manager will provide the
NAVAIR Project Coord ina tor /Manager with copies of pertinent
correspondence between and among participating field activ-
ities, contractors and the Development Manager. The NAVAIR
Project Coordinator /Manager will provide the Development
Manager with correspondence and reports judged to be useful
and/or desirable to the Development Manager.
REPORTING
a. Rou tine . A systematic, periodic reporting method
will be established by the NAVWPNSCEN Development Manager
to indicate progress of the AGILE development program in
relation to the pre-established technical, fiscal and
schedule milestones. Insofar as possible, such reports will
be those used by the Development Manager.
b
.
Special . Special reports will be needed by the
NAVAIR Project Coord ina tor /Manager frcTr. time to time to meet
special requirements, Such reports will be provided by the
NAVWPNSCEN Development Manager on a mutually agreed upon
basis
c. Technical Periodic technical reviews will be
scheduled by the NAVWPNSCEN Development Manager at least
every fourth month at which time the technical status of
the program will be discussed in detail. The NAVAIR Project
Coord ina tor /Manager and selected members of his Headquarters
staff will attend these meetings.
R. J. MO RAN T. R. McCLELLAN
Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy
Commander, Naval Weapons Commander, Naval Air Systems
Center Command
APPROVED:
J. D. ARNOLD R. A. PROSCH
Admiral, U.S. Navy Assistant Secretary of the Navy







CHINA LAKE, CALIFORNIA 93555
Area Coordination: Commandant, Eleventh Naval
District
A. Mission . The mission of the Naval Weapons Center,
promulgated by reference (a), is to be the principal Navy
RDT&E Center for air warfare and missile weapon systems.
B. Functions . The Naval Weapons Center shall establish and
maintain the primary (although not necessarily exclusive)
in-house research and development capability for the follow-
ing Navy and Marine Corps systems, subsystems and technolo-
gies: • .
. .-.••.
Strike aircraf t /weapon systems and concept develop-,
ment
Aircraft/weapon simulation
Survivability analysis and test
•
* Air-launched weapons and associated avionics systems
Aircraft guns and ammunition • " ''
Guided and unguided weapons
Aircraft weapons control and aircraft/weapons
interface











Strike warfare c ountermeasur es
Weather modification
C. F a c i 1 itics . The Naval Weapons Center shall maintain the













Explosives Research and Development Facilities
Propulsion Research Laboratories
Aircraft Survivability Facility
Carrier Fire Simulation Facility
Microelectronics Facility
Microwave Anechoic Facilities
D. Program Offices . The Naval Weapons Center shall carry




Attack and anti-air aircraft systems
.. • Atmospheric applications research project
AGILE
E. Documentation . The Naval Weapons Center shall carry
out assigned responsibility for timely submission and
updating of the technical input to the following documents.
In view of the diversity of technical competence in the Navy
in-house RDT&E community, this responsibility includes







Environmental technology - air*
Navy General Operational Requirements:.
GOR 11 Airborne Attack
14 Amphibious**
16 Airborne Anti-Air Warfare+
Marine Corps General Operational Requirements:
GOR Anti-Air Systems(AAS)
*To be transferred from MADC in FY 1973.
**Transfer to NCSL by FY 1974 is under consideration.









MM tV tlfit tAt UNCLASSIFIED as of 1 Feb 1973
ASN R&D 218
MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
CHIEF OF NAVAL MATERIAL
Subj : AGILE Weapon System Development; responsibility
assignment
The Advanced Short Range Air-to-Air Missile System,
AGILE, Development Program, was initiated in Fiscal 1968.
The Development Concept Paper //15 and subsequent Deputy
,
Secretary of Defense directions have resulted in the current
Navy program for the development of a single missile system
for joint U SA F/USN service use.
In consonance with the importance of this program, I
desire that the AGILE Weapon System design and development
through prototype test and evaluation be the direct respon-
sibility of the Naval Weapon Center, China Lake, California.
The longer term problem of pilot line and production procure-
ment should be accomplished jointly with the appropriate
CNM organization. In order to provide early attention in
the Engineering Design and Development Phase to production
and support requirements, the appropriate CNM personnel
should be assigned to the Naval Weapons Center project now.
The Ni7C will seek technical assistance from other Naval
laboratories, the Office of Naval Material and contractors
when and as appropriate to the program needs.
The funds associated with the Design and Weapon System
Development Phase will be under the fiscal management and
control of the Naval Weapons Center.
I have asked the Director of Naval Laboratories to
keep me informed as to the progress of this assignment and
to give particular attention to the program to ensure that
the system meets the joint requirements of the Navy and the
Air Force as well as provides for the orderly transition of
the system through development and production into inventory
Copy to :
DEPSECDEF
ASAF(R&D) ROBERT A, FROSCH
DNL
COMNWC




DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
WASHINGTON, D.C, 20350





MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHIEF OF NAVAL MATERIAL
Subj : Improved Research and Development Procedures
The present procedure for the procurement of new
military equipment has been implemented in such a way that
paper studies have largely replaced the testing of experi-
mental hardware in guiding the preparation of requirements
for production.
Based on my recent experience in Vietnam, I believe
that judgement of the utility and acceptable cost of new
equipment can only be established through experience with
operating models. In addition, the trade-offs between dif-
ferent technical solutions can best be established by direct
competition between their hardware implementations.
To do this effectively, I believe that we should al-
locate to the Navy laboratories the funding necessary to
generate working models needed to establish the specifica-
tions and requirements for procurement.
In line with our current emphasis on decentralization
of authority, please provide me your plan by which Program
Managers would task and fund laboratories with the develop-
ment of major system concepts and the construction and test
of critical hardware.
For example would it not be possible to assign:
1. "CAPTOR" to the Naval Ordnance Laboratory.
2. Sonar and weapons for the mid 70 submarine to
the Naval Underwater Systems Center.
3. The ULMS defensive suit to the Naval Undersea
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